This book focuses on African metaphysics and epistemology, and is an exercise in decoloniality. The authors describe their approach to "decoloniality" as an intellectual repudiation of coloniality, using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Focusing specifically on both African metaphysics and African epistemology, the authors put forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. They emphasize that this book is not a project in comparative philosophy, nor is it geared (...) towards making Africa/ns the object/subjects of philosophy. Rather, the book highlights and discusses philosophical insights that have been produced from the African perspective, which the authors argue must be further developed in order to achieve decoloniality in the field of philosophy more broadly. (shrink)

In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips. I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed.

Various influential ethical theories propose that we should strive to develop morally sound character traits, either because good actions are those that issue from good character traits, or because good traits are those that generally incline us toward actions that are good for some independent reason such as the intentions with which they are performed or the consequences of performing them. This proposal obviously raises questions about the nature and origins of character traits, and our degree of control over them. (...) For if we cannot develop our traits then this proposal should be abandoned, and if we can then we need to know how this is best achieved. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is two fold: first, I look to show Oaklander’s theory of time to be false. Second, I show that the only way to salvage the B-theory is via the adopting of the causal theory of time, and allying this to Oaklander’s claim that tense is to be eliminated. I then raise some concerns with the causal theory of time. My conclusion is that, if one adopts eternalism, the unreality of time looks a better option than (...) the B-theory. (shrink)

Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.

Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) claim that conversationalists do not explicitly keep track of their interlocuters' information states is important. Nonetheless, via alignment, they seem to create a virtually symmetrical view of the information states of speaker and addressee – a key component of their accounts of collaborative utterances and of self-monitoring. As I show, there is significant evidence for intrinsic contextual misalignment between conversationalists that can persist across turns.

The expanding interest in book history over recent years has heralded the coming together of an interdisciplinary research community drawing scholars from a variety of literary, historical and cultural studies. Moreover, with a growing body of literature, the field is becoming increasingly visible on a wider scale, not least through the existence of the Society for the History of Authorship, Readership and Publishing , with its newly founded journal Book History. Within the history of science, however, there remains not a (...) little scepticism concerning the practical value of such an approach. It is often dismissed as an intellectual fad or as an enterprise which is illuminating but ultimately peripheral, rather than being valued as an approach which can offer major new insights within the field. This is no doubt in part because much of the most innovative work in history of science over recent years has been carried out by historians anxious to get away from an earlier overemphasis on printed sources. Eager to correct a profoundly unsocial history of ideas, usually rooted in texts, historians have looked increasingly to both the practices and the material culture of science. In such a context, a renewed focus on the history of books sometimes seems like a retrograde step, especially given the common misidentification of ‘books’ with ‘texts’. On the contrary, however, it is just such a twin emphasis on practices and material culture which also characterizes the new book history. Indeed, to the question ‘what is book history for?’ we might answer that its object is to reintroduce social actors, engaged in a variety of practices with respect to material objects, into a history in which books have too often been understood merely as disembodied texts, the meaning of which is defined by singular, uniquely creative authors, and is transparent to readers. (shrink)

Truth, etc. is a wide-ranging study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given by the eminent philosopher Jonathan Barnes in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss, first, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the 'justification of deduction'; and sixthly, (...) the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs. In principle, the book presupposes no knowledge of logic and no skill in ancient languages: all ancient texts are cited in English translation; and logical symbols and logical jargon are avoided so far as possible. There is no scholarly apparatus of footnotes, and no bibliography. It can be read in an armchair. Anyone interested in ancient philosophy, or in logic and its history, will find it interesting. (shrink)

Third-party punishment (TPP) occurs when the perpetrator of a transgression is punished by an individual who is not the victim of the transgression and, therefore, not directly affected by it. As F...

The story of the preceding article continues….

Knowledge is desirable both for its own sake and because without it we will not be able to take the right means to whatever ends we happen to have. Much knowledge is interesting to oneself and others as well as useful, and a man without it will be an impoverished bore, as well as being unsuccessful in his enterprises.

Prologue -- Part 1: Property, personification, and idols: Owning things; the crying of lost things; making babies in the South Seas; the growth of idols; The rape of the lock as still life -- Part 2: Persons and fictions: Locke's wild fancies; fictionality and the representation of persons -- Part 3: Authors and nonpersons: me and my ink; things as authors; authors owning nothing.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional in a (...) way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion, or (5) the source of our moral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. I take issue with the elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that centre on (1) to (3) and (5), concluding that his case against moral intuitionism is unpersuasive. (shrink)

The methods of experiments in the social sciences should depend on their purposes. To support this claim, I attempt to state some general principles relating method to purpose for three of the issues addressed. (I do not understand what is not a script, so I will omit that issue.) I illustrate my outline with examples from psychological research on judgment and decision making (JDM).

Quevedo brings together a number of philosophical traditions in the Suenos. One chapter of the thesis examines Quevedo's use of Epicurean dream theory as well as the larger ramifications of the dream setting for the satires. Another chapter analyzes the exact nature of Quevedo's sceptical views and their classical sources with emphasis on the content of El mundo por de dentro. Included is a discussion of the moral philosophy presented in the Suenos, deriving primarily from Stoic sources. In each case, (...) Quevedo reconciles these classical influences with Christian doctrine, leading to a discussion in the thesis as to the exact nature of his Christian beliefs as they are expressed in the Suenos, i.e., whether Quevedo was indeed an existentialist and nihilist as many have labeled him. (shrink)

Since taking office, the President of the United States has consistently refused to make his tax returns available for public scrutiny. In so doing, he has broken with presidential tradition and kept people guessing about what his tax returns would show if they were disclosed. Interestingly enough, in the absence of concrete knowledge about the President’s tax circumstances, some taxpayers perceive that he did not pay his fair share and others perceive that he did. This situation presents an opportunity for (...) us to consider how vertical equity perceptions about the President’s fair share of taxes, and identification with the President via voting behavior, are jointly associated with taxpayers’ compliance. Using insights from equity theory as reported in Adams Advances in experimental social psychology, Academic Press, New York, 1965) and social learning theory as reported in Bandura, we anticipate and find that those taxpayers who perceive that the President did not pay his fair share of taxes and who most closely socially identify with him have the lowest tax compliance. We use a survey of 600 American taxpayers to capture their perceptions of vertical equity, voting behavior, and tax compliance intentions. Our results may reflect that taxpayers who identify with the President will tend to model his tax-related actions, or may also indicate that some taxpayers vote for a president whose actions are similar to their own. Insights and implications for ethics and tax researchers and tax policy makers are discussed. (shrink)

One neglected influence on Stanley Hauerwas is the work of Julian Hartt. In this essay, I trace three ways in which Hartt has influenced Hauerwas: in his understanding of the task of theology, in his conception of theological ethics, and in his use of narrative. I identify these elements in Hartt's theology and argue, in the light of these influences, for a particular interpretation of Hauerwas's work. I also note three areas of discontinuity between Hartt and Hauerwas for future exploration.